SAUDI BRITISH
JOINT BUSINESS COUNCIL

Regional Security Brief: Implications for the Kingdom and UK-Saudi Trade

Information correct as of 27 October 2026

At a glance

1. Since July a renewed Houthi campaign of missile and drone attacks has reached airports and energy infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, alongside continuing disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

2. The FCDO advises against all but essential travel to the whole of the Kingdom and advises British nationals to stay away from King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.

3. The Ministry of Finance, the IMF and the World Bank all expect the Saudi economy to contract in 2026 because of lost oil output, while the non-oil economy continues to grow and a recovery is forecast for 2027.

4. In SBJBC Research's assessment, companies already operating in the Kingdom can continue to do so with appropriate precautions, and much new commercial engagement can be taken forward without travel.

5. Current FCDO advice still allows essential travel to the Kingdom, and members should follow it closely. Revision either way, whether an easing or a tightening, will shape what is possible for business in the months ahead.

This brief sets out SBJBC Research's assessment and does not replace FCDO travel advice, the terms of insurance policies or companies' own security advice.

Key judgements

Since July the Kingdom has faced a renewed Houthi campaign of missile and drone attacks that has reached airports in Riyadh, Dammam and Abha, alongside energy infrastructure in the Eastern Province and on the Red Sea coast. This is all in addition to the continuing effects on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz of the war between the United States, Israel and Iran. The FCDO advises against all but essential travel to the whole of the Kingdom (shown in amber on the FCDO's maps), a position with direct consequences for business travel, insurance cover and the operations of UK companies with staff in the country. International support for the Kingdom's defence has widened considerably in the past week, with the UK, France, Egypt and Turkey each announcing or advancing defensive commitments already in place or expected. On the ground, the postponement of the Future Investment Initiative (FII) to 2027 highlights the effect of the security situation on Saudi Arabia's programme of international business events.

Over the past week continued pressure has sat alongside partial normalisation, as King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh resumed international flights by Saudi carriers on 25 October. Houthi missiles and drones have continued to target Riyadh, the Eastern Province, the south of the country and, according to Saudi Civil Defence, the Mecca and Medina regions, while statements from Washington and Tehran point to a continuing risk of renewed US-Iran hostilities. Diplomacy has also moved, with Saudi Arabia's Defence Minister leading a delegation of Makkah Pact countries to Tehran on 26 October for talks at which the parties agreed to keep talking, and Egypt's parliament on the same day authorising President El Sisi to support the Kingdom's defence.

The economic effects are concentrated in the oil sector, and both the IMF and the Ministry of Finance expect output to contract in 2026 before recovering in 2027, while the non-oil economy continues to grow and the government intends to sustain priority spending through borrowing.

SBJBC Research does not offer a single forecast, since the outlook for business depends on a few observable indicators that are set out in the scenarios section of this brief. The most important are progress in diplomacy over the Strait of Hormuz, the range and targets of Houthi attacks, the decisions of the countries supporting Saudi Arabia's defence, and the FCDO's travel advice. While these indicators stay broadly where they are, SBJBC Research judges that UK companies already established in the Kingdom can continue to operate with appropriate precautions, and that the situation does not in itself rule out new commercial engagement, much of which can be taken forward without travel. Decisions on travel should follow FCDO advice, the terms of each company's insurance and its own security advice, and companies should keep their commitments to Saudi partners and clients.

This view would change if the situation escalated in any of the ways described in the scenarios section, and the development members should watch most closely is any move by the FCDO to advise against all travel to Saudi Arabia or to parts of it. SBJBC will continue to work to strengthen commercial ties between the two countries, and the way UK companies conduct themselves during this period is likely to shape how they are regarded as friends and partners of the Kingdom well after it.

What this means for our members

Since 16 October the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has advised against all but essential travel to the whole of Saudi Arabia, and it continues to advise against all travel within 10km of the border with Yemen.[1,2] It describes a heightened threat to airports, military sites, ports and energy infrastructure across the country, including Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam and Yanbu, and judges further attacks on airports to be very likely.[2]

In the near term the main effect on UK business is on the movement of people, and the practical response is to plan travel around FCDO advice and the terms of insurance. The FCDO warns that travel against its advice could invalidate insurance,[2] although the effect depends on the individual policy, so firms should confirm cover with their insurer before each trip, bearing in mind that a business decision that a visit is essential does not by itself guarantee cover. With foreign airlines only gradually returning to Riyadh and the FCDO advising British nationals to stay away from King Khalid International Airport, firms should consider other routes into and out of the country, including through neighbouring states.

Much business can still be done through staff and partners already in the Kingdom, by video and through meetings in neighbouring countries, although the Gulf hubs carry regional risks of their own. Firms that had planned around the Future Investment Initiative or Intersec Saudi Arabia will need to rely on these channels until both events take place in 2027.[3]

For UK nationals living in Saudi Arabia, the FCDO advises following Saudi Civil Defence alerts, staying away from areas around oil infrastructure and military facilities, keeping travel documents up to date and avoiding capturing or sharing images of conflict-related incidents.[2] It adds that the greatest risk comes from falling debris after interceptions, that people are safest inside a secure structure, and that an interior stairwell or a room with as few external walls or windows as possible may give extra protection.[2] For those who wish to leave, the FCDO suggests considering travel by land to a neighbouring country and flying from there, if they judge it safe to do so.[4] The US Mission reported on 21 October that land crossings, including the King Fahd Causeway to Bahrain, were operating, although crossings can close at short notice during security alerts.[5]

On 21 October the US State Department ordered non-emergency US government employees and their families to leave its missions in Saudi Arabia,[6] and multinational employers are likely to use this as a reference point when reviewing their own arrangements for staff and dependants.

Exporters of goods should expect higher freight and war-risk costs on Red Sea routes, as set out in the section on the economy, and may wish to review contract terms on delivery times and insurance with their customers and brokers accordingly.

Saudi Arabia plans to finance part of its deficit through export credit agencies and project finance[7] and to expand export capacity through the East-West Pipeline.[8] Both suggest that commercial opportunities will continue through the conflict, especially where UK Export Finance support can be combined with British expertise in engineering, insurance, project finance and infrastructure resilience. Companies employing Saudi nationals should also build the higher Nitaqat wage threshold into their workforce planning for 2027 and 2028.[9]

In SBJBC Research's assessment, UK companies already established in Saudi Arabia can continue to operate while current conditions hold, and companies considering new business can take much of it forward without travel. Each should assess its own exposure, keep its travel and security arrangements under review against the indicators in this brief, and be ready to change course quickly if the situation worsens. Companies that keep their commitments to Saudi partners and clients during this period, while managing risk sensibly, are likely to find those relationships stronger once conditions improve, and SBJBC will continue to support members in doing so.

Recent developments

Since the end of February the Kingdom has been affected by two overlapping conflicts, the first being the war that began with US and Israeli air strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026.[10] Iran responded with attacks on

US bases and on sites in neighbouring states and closed the Strait of Hormuz, and although a pause was agreed on 8 April and a 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed on 17 June, the conflict has continued and the strait remains heavily restricted.[10,11] In the week to 16 October the UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO) recorded 125 outbound and 129 inbound transits and at least 12 attacks on ships, while cautioning that most vessels attacked no longer report to it.[11] Kpler put oil flows through the strait at 11.6 million barrels a day in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war level, while US Central Command maintains that the strait is open and that 400 ships passed through it in the same week.[11]

Incidents at sea continued into the past week, and UKMTO reported that a projectile struck a tanker off Oman's Musandam province on 21 October.[12] Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that seven tankers were attacked or hit mines overnight into 22 October and that two supertankers struck mines the following day.[13] On 24 October the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces said that US warships would not be allowed to enter the Gulf.[13] The US President has since said publicly that he must choose between escalating the conflict and making a deal, and additional US forces, including a third aircraft carrier group, have been sent to the region.[14] He nonetheless ruled out strikes on 25 October while keeping the prospect of renewed military action open, and Qatari mediators travelled to Tehran the same day as part of a US-coordinated effort to reduce tensions.[15]

The second conflict is the renewed confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen, which resumed on 13 July with a missile attack on Abha International Airport.[16] ACLED recorded Houthi or suspected Houthi missile and drone attacks on the Kingdom on 25 separate days between 13 July and 25 September, with energy infrastructure the most frequent target followed by aviation, and attacks reached Riyadh for the first time on 19 September.[16] Over the same period the Houthis declared a blockade of Saudi-linked shipping and, in a September offensive along Yemen's Red Sea coast, took Mocha and territory around the Bab al-Mandab, although government forces have since recovered some of that ground.[16,17]

Attacks on civil aviation increased sharply in October, after the Yemeni government launched an offensive against the group and the Houthis declared Saudi airspace a zone of military operations.[18] ACLED counts 17 attacks or attempted attacks on Saudi airports since 5 October, and King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh was struck on four separate days from 7 October, with an attack on 10 October alone killing at least 12 people and wounding more than 300.[17,18] On the evening of 21 October an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam killed two people, a Saudi citizen and an Indian resident, and injured eight, although the civil aviation authority said operations had returned to normal the next day.[19]

King Khalid International Airport resumed international flights by Saudi carriers from Terminal 2 on 25 October, with domestic flights using Terminal 1.[20] Most foreign airlines have not yet returned, with British Airways planning a single daily Riyadh service from 3 November and Lufthansa not expected until 18 November.[21] The Houthis have warned airlines and passengers that they regard the airport as a military target,[20] and the FCDO continues to advise British nationals to stay away from it, noting that it remains at risk of further attacks.[22,2]

Cross-border attacks continued over the weekend of 24 and 25 October, when Saudi Civil Defence reported falling debris in the Mecca and Medina regions after two Houthi missiles were intercepted, which the Houthis deny targeting.[20] On 25 October the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile and a drone aimed at Riyadh, a cruise missile aimed at Khamis Mushait and ten ballistic missiles fired towards the south of the country.[20] According to Saudi Civil Defence, debris from two of those interceptions injured two people and damaged three residential buildings and seven vehicles in Khamis Mushait and Ahad Rafidah.[20] Early on 26 October a further ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh was intercepted, and the coalition

said it had destroyed two missile launchers in Sanaa, including the one used in that attack.[23] The Houthis claimed to have struck King Khalid International Airport and oil pumping stations, although the coalition reported only the interception of the missile aimed at the capital.[24] On 27 October the coalition reported intercepting three ballistic missiles and four drones, after Saudi Civil Defence issued emergency alerts in the Eastern Province and the Al Kharj governorate.[25]

Energy infrastructure has been a consistent target, and ACLED records that nearly a quarter of Houthi attacks and attempted attacks between 13 July and 14 October were aimed at oil facilities, with around 12 causing fires or damage, including an attack on Aramco's headquarters in Dhahran on 13 October.[17] In September a drone attack launched from Iraq forced a temporary shutdown of the East-West Pipeline, the 1,200km line that carries crude from the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea and allows exports to bypass Hormuz.[17,26] The Minister of Energy said on 6 October that flows had recovered to 5.8 million barrels a day, against a maximum capacity of 7 million barrels a day.[26] On 21 October a drone aimed at a processing facility at Aramco's Shaybah field was intercepted, and although falling debris killed two people and injured two more, the Ministry of Energy said operations were unaffected.[19]

The Kingdom's partners have stepped up their support for its defence, and on 18 October Egypt's National Defence Council, chaired by President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, agreed to provide all possible forms of support to help the Kingdom defend its security.[27] The President asked parliament to authorise him to act on any request from Saudi Arabia, a step that needed a two-thirds majority, and he has said that Egyptian support would be strictly defensive and would not involve attacks inside Yemen.[28,12] Parliament gave that authorisation by the required majority on 26 October, allowing the President to act in coordination with Saudi Arabia to defend its territory, sovereignty and holy sites.[29] A regional official told the Associated Press that Egypt would deploy air defence systems and aircraft rather than ground troops.[30]

During President Emmanuel Macron's visit to Riyadh on 21 October, France confirmed that its forces had been helping to protect the Yanbu oil terminal for eight days, and Turkey had submitted the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to its parliament for ratification the day before.[12] The UK announced on 20 October that RAF Typhoon aircraft would be deployed to Saudi Arabia in a defensive role, as set out in the final section of this brief.[31] On 26 October Saudi Arabia's Defence Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, led a delegation of Makkah Pact countries, including Pakistan's army chief and Turkey's intelligence chief, to Tehran for talks that the Saudi side described as an effort to ease regional tensions.[32] The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the visit was intended to de-escalate tensions, encourage dialogue and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan, and it called on all parties to engage positively with its outcome.[33,34] The participants agreed to continue their discussions, and a senior Pakistani security official told Reuters that the talks focused on a regional non-aggression framework and also covered US-Iran negotiations, Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Strait of Hormuz.[35]

The security situation has also affected the Kingdom's programme of international business events, and on 19 October the FII Institute announced that the tenth Future Investment Initiative, due to take place in Riyadh from 26 to 29 October, would be held in 2027 instead, with new dates to follow.[3] Its chief executive said the decision reflected the Institute's commitment to delivering an exceptional anniversary edition.[36] Intersec Saudi Arabia has moved to October 2027 and the Saudi Retail Forum to March 2027, and a planned summit between Saudi Arabia and the European Union has also been postponed.[3]

Why it is happening

The Strait of Hormuz is now the main point of pressure between the United States and Iran, and neither side appears to regard further delay as costly to itself. Iran's parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf,

said on 4 October that the strait would not reopen until seven conditions drawn from the June memorandum were met.[37] An Iranian plan to restore normal passage within seven days if those conditions were accepted was rejected by President Trump in late September, although messages have continued to pass between the two sides through Qatari intermediaries.[38,37] Iran has also sought a new regime for the strait that would include transit charges, which Oman opposes and which the United States has said would be unacceptable in any deal.[10] Washington says its naval blockade continues to stop Iranian seaborne exports and imports and has cost Iran 25 billion US dollars in oil income.[11] By 24 October mediated talks were no closer to a result,[13] and while each side waits for the other to give way, a prolonged stand-off remains the most likely outcome.

Diplomacy beyond the US-Iran channel has also picked up, and on 23 October senior diplomats from the UK, France, Germany and Italy met counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan in Istanbul, with neither the United States nor Iran present.[13] The four regional states issued a statement backing the June memorandum and a negotiated settlement, calling for free passage through Hormuz and condemning Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and its Red Sea shipping.[13] For UK companies the meeting shows the UK working with Saudi Arabia and other partners on reducing tensions and keeping shipping lanes open, both of which are preconditions for normal trade.

The IMF links Saudi Arabia's smaller contraction to its more diversified export routes, above all the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu,[39,8] but the same capacity has made infrastructure in the west of the country a more valuable target. The September attack on the pipeline from Iraq showed this vulnerability,[17] and the deployment of French forces to help protect the Yanbu terminal suggests that Saudi Arabia's partners see the same risk.

The Houthi campaign serves Iranian interests in part, but it also reflects the group's own aims in Yemen. ACLED has described it as calibrated coercion, with attacks on Saudi territory increasing while attacks at sea have largely been confined to Saudi-linked ships, which raises the pressure on Riyadh while limiting the risk of a wider international response.[16] The Houthis present their strikes on airports as an "airport-for-airport" response to Saudi military operations in Yemen,[17] and their chief negotiator has blamed the current escalation on a strike on Sanaa airport in mid-July, which the group attributes to Saudi Arabia.[27] A Saudi diplomat has said that the Kingdom proposed a meeting with the Houthis in Oman in July, which the group declined, while the Houthis say they would stop their attacks if Saudi Arabia agreed to what they call humanitarian demands.[27] Because the infrastructure to be defended is spread so widely, even a campaign in which most weapons are intercepted can impose costs well beyond the physical damage, mainly through disrupted flights, higher security costs and uncertainty for business.[17]

Scenarios for the next six to twelve months

The scenarios below are built around indicators that members can follow for themselves, so that they can judge how the situation is moving. If current conditions hold, Hormuz would remain heavily restricted into 2027, in line with the IMF's assumption that the strait begins to reopen only in March 2027 and returns broadly to normal by October 2027.[39] ACLED expects Houthi attacks to keep causing casualties, local damage and recurring disruption at airports and energy sites, while major energy operations and most commercial activity remain functional.[17] It judges that this pattern is likely to last for the next three to six months unless Saudi military strategy, Houthi capabilities or the regional picture change significantly.[17] For companies this would mean higher operating and insurance costs and travel that is possible but subject to disruption, in an economy where non-oil activity continues to grow.

A move towards de-escalation would most likely start with agreement on the order of steps in the proposals now passing between Washington and Tehran, which Iran says could allow normal passage through Hormuz to resume within seven days.[37] A parallel easing with the Houthis appears less likely in the near term, given the continuing exchange of strikes.[17] ACLED notes that the group's offer on 10 October to spare airports, seaports and humanitarian facilities on both sides could provide an opening, although later attacks cast doubt on it, and that mediation by Oman or the United Nations could lead to mutual limits on cross-border strikes.[17] The agreement in Tehran on 26 October to continue talks is an early test of whether regional diplomacy can open a route to lower tensions, and even partial restraint would ease pressure on Saudi export routes, restore some confidence in air travel and reduce freight and insurance costs.

Several kinds of escalation would change this assessment, the first being a sharper Houthi campaign, which ACLED regards as plausible if a wider Saudi offensive, possibly with direct US involvement, provokes more intensive retaliation.[17] Repeated successful strikes would then cause overlapping shutdowns at airports, energy sites and transport networks, and prolonged disruption to the East-West Pipeline or Red Sea export terminals would be particularly serious while Hormuz remains restricted.[17] A widening of Houthi attacks at sea to ships with no Saudi connection would also mark a change, since it would end the selective targeting that ACLED describes and raise the risk to all shipping using the Red Sea.[16]

A renewed large-scale US or Israeli campaign against Iran would carry the most severe consequences, and ACLED judges that it would very likely bring attacks by Iran and Iraq-based militias alongside those of the Houthis, exposing Saudi infrastructure to threats from several directions.[17] The FCDO also warns that renewed Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia remain possible,[2] and Tehran has threatened Gulf energy facilities, power networks, water systems, data centres and communications cables in that event, which UK firms that rely on regional digital services should take into account in their continuity planning.[17]

For people living in the Kingdom, the change that would matter most is any shift in Houthi targeting towards residential or commercial areas, which would be likely to prompt a change in FCDO advice. Falling debris from interceptions already poses a risk in cities, and ACLED records at least five such incidents since mid-July, including one in Riyadh on 13 October that injured four people and damaged 15 residential buildings.[17] The scope of Egypt's deployment following the parliamentary vote is also worth watching, although President El Sisi has said it would be strictly defensive,[12] because ACLED regards a shift by foreign partners from defensive support to operations in Yemen as capable of widening the conflict.[16]

The development members should watch most closely is any move by the FCDO to advise against all travel, whether to the whole country or to particular regions, since travel against its advice can invalidate insurance and corporate travel policies commonly follow it.[2] Other signs of movement between these scenarios include progress in the Hormuz talks, any Houthi attack on a ship with no Saudi connection, the form of any Egyptian deployment, any follow-up to the Tehran talks, the return of foreign airlines to Riyadh and reported flows through the East-West Pipeline.

Impact on the Kingdom's economy and markets

All three official forecasts now expect the Saudi economy to contract in 2026, and they differ mainly on the size of the fall. The Ministry of Finance estimates a 3.6% fall in real GDP, driven by a decline of around 21.8% in oil activities, while non-oil activities are expected to grow by about 3.2% and reached a record 57.3% of GDP in the first half.[7] The IMF's October World Economic Outlook projects a contraction of 3.3%, having forecast growth of 3.1% as recently as April,[39,40] and the World Bank projects a smaller fall of 2.0%, with the oil sector contracting by 17.7%.[41] The Ministry expects real growth of 12.8% in 2027,[42]

against 7.9% from the IMF,[8] and the gap appears to reflect different assumptions about how quickly oil output recovers.

Export volumes have already recovered more than these annual figures suggest, with Kpler estimating Saudi crude exports at 6.67 million barrels a day in September, the highest level in seven months and back to pre-war levels.[8] The IEA has also reported a strong recovery in Saudi oil production and exports in September.[17] The Minister of Energy has set a target of raising export capacity to around 10 million barrels a day within two to three years by upgrading the East-West Pipeline.[8] He has also pointed to the possible temporary conversion of a gas pipeline that could add about 1.2 million barrels a day within seven to eight weeks.[8]

Brent rose to about 117 US dollars a barrel in the week to 24 October, its highest level since April, before easing at the start of this week.[13,14] Higher prices have not made up for lost export volumes earlier in the year, however, and the Ministry has raised its estimate of the 2026 deficit to 245 billion riyals, or 4.9% of GDP, against 165 billion riyals in the original budget.[43] For 2027 it projects spending of 1,392 billion riyals and revenue of 1,202 billion riyals, a deficit of about 3.6% of GDP, to be financed through bonds, sukuk and loans and through greater use of project finance, infrastructure finance and export credit agencies.[7] The government therefore intends to keep spending on priority projects through the conflict, although a larger borrowing requirement is likely to mean closer prioritisation between projects.

The non-oil private sector has continued to grow, with the Riyad Bank PMI rising to 55.3 in September, its highest reading since February, even though the General Authority for Statistics reported a 4.7% year-on-year fall in real GDP in the second quarter, when non-oil activities grew by 0.9%.[44] Firms reported sharp increases in material and transport costs,[44] while unemployment among Saudi nationals fell to 6.5% in the second quarter and the Ministry expects inflation of about 2.1% for 2026, although the World Bank expects higher transport and import costs to push it to 3.4%.[7,41]

Two measures announced on 26 October will affect companies operating in the Kingdom from next year. Electricity, water and wastewater tariffs will be revised from 1 January 2027, with a limited effect expected for most industrial, commercial and agricultural electricity users, and eligible citizens will receive monthly support of 500 riyals.[9] The minimum monthly wage at which a Saudi employee counts fully towards a company's Saudisation quota under the Nitaqat programme will also rise, to 5,000 riyals from 25 April 2027 and to 6,000 riyals from 25 April 2028.[9]

Shipping and insurance costs have risen with the Red Sea campaign, and on 29 July the London market's Joint War Committee extended its Red Sea high-risk area northwards along the Saudi coast towards Jizan.[45] Indicative war-risk premiums for Jeddah and Yanbu rose to 1% of a vessel's value from 0.25% earlier that week, while those for voyages through the southern Red Sea stood at between 1% and 2%, compared with 0.3% before the Houthi blockade was announced.[45] Saudi banks remain in a strong position, and the Governor of the Saudi Central Bank told the IMF's International Monetary and Financial Committee in Bangkok that their capital and liquidity positions are robust.[46]

UK-Saudi trade and UK Government support

The latest official trade figures cover the four quarters to the end of March 2026 and so include only the first month of the conflict.[47] Over that period total trade between the UK and Saudi Arabia was 13.4 billion pounds, 15.5% lower than a year earlier, and UK exports fell by 24% to 9.6 billion pounds, largely because services exports fell by 35.8%.[47] Goods exports were steadier, down 5% to 4.6 billion pounds and led by mechanical power generators and pharmaceuticals, while UK imports rose by 17.2% to 3.8 billion pounds, mainly refined oil.[47] The fall in services exports therefore began before the war, and the next release, due on 30 October, will be the first to show its effect.[47]

The UK Government has increased its support for the Kingdom's defence, agreeing in September, following a request from the Saudi Government, to provide an RAF Voyager tanker for air-to-air refuelling, and noting that escalating tensions in the Gulf can raise prices, disrupt energy supplies and add costs for British businesses.[48] On 20 October the Ministry of Defence announced that RAF Typhoon aircraft would fly defensive counter-air missions to help protect Saudi cities and critical national infrastructure, supported by an A400M transport aircraft, military advisers and an extension of the refuelling support.[31]

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